Operating business14% entry signalMarket screen5 sourced figuresStructure decidesentry cost + regulatory drag

Other Provincial Government Administration

SoftwareTypically runs on Case management, licensing and registries, bought by tender. · no software market screened here yet — the industry page
Prepared 2026-09-19

The industry — Other provincial and territorial public administration

Base industry report for 9129 →
Establishments · CanadaA
1,597
with employees
Under 10 employeesA
34%
most common size: 1–4

Of 1,597 Canadian establishments with employees, 34% have fewer than ten — an industry where large establishments carry real weight.

Entry signal — what decides who wins here

Structure decides
Structure decides One thing must be true Execution decides

The binding constraint is not executional. Being better than the incumbent does not, by itself, get you in — this one is cleared with capital, an asset, or a permission.

What you would have to beat

Raise or borrow the entry ticket, or buy an operator who has already paid it. The barrier is money rather than permission, so it yields to a balance sheet — and an acquisition is usually cheaper than a start.

How it was read
Binding constraintUNVERIFIEDentry cost + regulatory drag — Capital — being better does not, by itself, clear it.
How fragmented the field isA34% of establishments have fewer than ten employees — Concentrated — a new entrant competes against establishments with real scale.
What it costs to be in the businessUNVERIFIEDhigh capital — The structural profile of subsector 912, inherited by every industry beneath it.

This is not a probability of success, and it is not a verdict on you. No survival probability is published per market, and inventing one would be worse than saying so. What the bar reads is how much of the outcome sits inside an operator's control: green means the hurdles are ones a better operator clears, red means the binding constraint is capital, an asset or a permission rather than execution. Someone arriving with an advantage this screen did not assume can win a market shown in red.

Companies named in this market · 5

The binding constraint — entry cost + regulatory drag

The residual for provincial and territorial administration — and the largest block in the sector: 1,597 establishments, 434 employing a hundred or more [A]. Ministries, agencies, boards and commissions. This is a buyer, not a market to enter: the activity is a function of government, carried out under statute by public servants, and no licence, acquisition or amount of capital lets a private entrant perform it. Ten provinces and three territories each run their own procurement with their own vendor-of-record lists, which makes this thirteen markets, not one. That fragmentation is an opening for a vendor with a regional base and a closed door for one without: reference customers inside the province matter more than price. Software sold here is screened at 912110. The cut factor is recorded as entry cost and regulatory drag because that is the nearest the screening model comes to 'not available to private parties' — the barrier is not high, it is absolute, and everything interesting is in what gets sold across it.

Market scaleregionalunit: one province's procurement system

The relevant geography is that of the buyer: one province's procurement system. A supplier competes for that buyer's contracts under that buyer's rules, and a win in one jurisdiction does not carry to the next without a fresh qualification.

Canadian establishments with employeesA 1,597 (Statistics Canada, December 2023) — 34% have fewer than ten employees; 434 employ 100 or more
When open tendering is triggered, and at which tier of the provincial stateA Ministries and agencies: $34,700 goods, $139,000 services or construction. Crown corporations and government enterprises: $694,700 goods or services, $6,943,900 construction. Canadian Free Trade Agreement, Article 504.3, effective 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2027
What the count measuresUNVERIFIED Government offices, detachments and agencies reporting as employers — not firms, and not a population an entrant could join
How it buysUNVERIFIED Public tender, standing offers and vendor-of-record lists, with prior references weighing heavily — the general pattern of Canadian public procurement, not read from any single province's own rules
I

Who you would be competing with

The operators already at scale here, and whoever is buying these businesses. In most of these industries the competition an entrant meets is local, so this is who sets the terms rather than a list of everyone in the trade.

Largest operator
CGI (TSX: GIB.A) — the Canadian integrator with the provincial reference lists an entrant is asked for and does not have
Scale
FY2025 revenue $15,912.7M, up 8.4% (4.6% in constant currency); Canada operating segment $2,090.7M; bookings $17.57B for a book-to-bill of 110.4%. No provincial-government split is published in the release or the MD&A.
Concentration
Not published, and not derivable — no province publishes vendor shares, and the thirteen jurisdictions do not report on a common basis.
Others in the field
Deloitte, IBM Canada and Accenture on the large programmes. Underneath them, and more relevant to an entrant, the incumbent already sitting on the province's vendor-of-record list for the category — a firm whose advantage is not its product but its place on the list. And beside both, the serial acquirers of small vertical-software businesses, who buy provincially entrenched products rather than build them, which is how most single-province vendors actually exit.
Lock-in mechanism
The vendor-of-record list, and the fact that thirteen of them exist. A reference inside the province counts; a reference in the province next door often does not. Stated as judgment; no province's own rules were read for this record.
Price movement
Not assessed.
Is the buyer consolidating?
No — The buyer is structurally unable to consolidate — thirteen jurisdictions, each with its own procurement authority, and no mechanism by which one could buy on another's behalf. That is what makes this different from the federal records: the fragmentation is permanent, and so is the cost of qualifying thirteen times.
F

Financials & market size — sourced

Figures that came from a filing, a results release or reputable reporting, each carrying its evidence tier.

CGI revenue, FY2025A $15,912.7M, up 8.4% (4.6% in constant currency)
CGI Canada operating segment revenue, FY2025A $2,090.7M
CGI bookings, FY2025A $17.57B, a book-to-bill ratio of 110.4%
Where the open-tender line sits for a ministryA $34,700 for goods, $139,000 for services or construction — CFTA Article 504.3(a)
Where it sits for a Crown corporation or government enterpriseA $694,700 for goods or services and $6,943,900 for construction — CFTA Article 504.3(c), five times the ministry threshold for services
V

The field

Every operator named on this record, and what each one discloses. A private single-site operator discloses nothing, which is the normal case — the listed consolidators are the only window in.

Competitor set · 4 named · 0 disclose revenue

NameRevenueShareNote
CGITSX: GIB.AA not disclosed — FY2025 revenue $15,912.7M with a $2,090.7M Canada segment. Revenue is not scored as this market's floor — no provincial-government split is published, and the global total has nothing to do with the size of thirteen provincial procurement systems.
Deloitte / IBM Canada / AccentureC not disclosed — Not researched for this record. Named because the large provincial programmes are awarded on prior delivery in that province, which they have accumulated and an entrant has not.
The incumbent on the province's vendor-of-record listUNVERIFIED not disclosed — The competitor an entrant actually loses to, and usually a firm nobody outside that province has heard of. Its advantage is the list, not the product. No province publishes the composition of its lists in a form that was read for this record.
Serial acquirers of provincial vertical softwareC not disclosed — The exit, and therefore also the competitor: firms that buy entrenched single-province products rather than build them, and can outbid an entrant for the same asset. Not researched for this record; none of the Canadian acquirers in this space publishes segment revenue.

Nobody here publishes revenue. The market is not sized for that reason — an estimate built on nothing would only look like knowledge.

Evidence

Evidence. The establishment count and its size bands are Statistics Canada, December 2023 [A]. This pass corrects the previous note, which said the trade-agreement thresholds do not reach this level of government — they do, and reading them sharpens the record's own argument. The Canadian Free Trade Agreement's Article 504.3 thresholds for the period 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2027 are read from the Internal Trade Secretariat's own document [A]: $34,700 for goods and $139,000 for services or construction at a ministry or agency of any Party, the provinces included, but $694,700 for goods or services and $6,943,900 for construction at a Crown corporation or government enterprise. That five-fold difference matters on this record specifically, because 9129 is where the agencies, boards and commissions sit: the same supplier faces a competitive-tender trigger five times higher at a Crown corporation than at the ministry that oversees it, so 'thirteen markets' understates the fragmentation rather than overstating it. CGI's fiscal 2025 figures come from its own results release and fourth-quarter MD&A [A]; neither publishes a breakdown by client vertical or by level of government, so no provincial share is claimed and no vendor revenue is treated as this market's floor. The vendor-of-record incumbents and the acquirers are named as categories because no province's list and no acquisition document was opened for this pass. What remains analyst judgment is the characterisation of what the establishment count measures and of how a reference inside the province outweighs one from outside it: UNVERIFIED. No US figure is attached because County Business Patterns excludes public administration. The 912110 and 913910 software records carry the rest of the sourced material on selling to government.

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Where the industry talks

The associations, forums and events where people in this trade actually talk shop — where to listen before entering, and where the first customers are found. Each link was opened on the date shown.

AssociationCanadaA
Institute of Public Administration of Canada
ipac.ca

Professional body for public servants, with regional groups in Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and elsewhere that serve provincial staff.

Checked 2026-09-22
AssociationCanadaA
Canadian Public Procurement Council
cppc-ccmp.ca

Body for public sector procurement professionals; regional sessions such as the Atlantic Public Procurement Power Session, Halifax, October 2026.

Checked 2026-09-22
AssociationCanadaA
National Union of Public and General Employees
nupge.ca

Federation of the provincial public service unions; its components are the bargaining agents in most provinces.

Checked 2026-09-22
AssociationBritish-ColumbiaA
BC General Employees' Union
bcgeu.ca

Largest BC public service union; bargaining and job action coverage is the clearest window into provincial workforce conditions.

Checked 2026-09-22
AssociationCanadaA
Institute on Governance
iog.ca

Non-profit running courses for public servants (cabinet documents, briefing notes) and advisory work with governments and public boards.

Checked 2026-09-22

opseu.org (Ontario's public service union) and publicsectordigest.com would both belong here but blocked or did not respond from this network; the entries above are the bodies provincial administrators and their procurement staff actually join.