Healthcare Revenue Cycle & Admin Software

What this category is. The layer of software the patient touches: the portal and app, digital intake and check-in, reminders and two-way texting, online bill pay and the personal health record. It sits on top of the chart and writes back into it. The coded customer is the physician's office (6211), but the biggest buyers are health systems and clinic networks, and the same products are sold to dentists, optometrists and specialists. How it differs from the neighbouring records. Electronic health records and practice management (6211) sells the record itself. Patient booking and doctor marketplaces (6211) sells patient acquisition: a marketplace of competing practitioners. Telehealth and remote patient monitoring (6219) sells the visit. This record covers what happens between a practice and the patients it already has. Two names the brief proposed fall into those neighbours. TELUS Health MyCare is a direct-to-consumer virtual clinic (telehealth, 6219). Medeo, owned by Loblaw through QHR Technologies, does offer booking, messaging and video visits for a patient's own clinic, so it stays on this record. The incumbent is the record vendor, not a portal company. Epic's MyChart says it serves over 190 million patients [A, mychart.org]. It comes with the Epic record, so a health system on Epic does not buy a separate patient portal. The ambulatory record vendors have done the same thing. eClinicalWorks ships healow. ModMed bought Klara in February 2022, and klara.com now redirects to ModMed's patient-engagement page [A/B]. Tebra sells patient experience alongside its record. In Canada, WELL Health bought CognisantMD's Ocean platform (booking, messaging, reminders, digital forms, kiosks and eReferral) in December 2021. At the time Ocean supported about 8,000 physicians and had about $4M of annual SaaS revenue [B, WELL release]. The independents that have scale. Phreesia (NYSE: PHR) earned $480.6M of revenue in fiscal 2026, its first full year of GAAP net income. It averaged 4,514 healthcare-services clients that year [B]. Part of that revenue comes from pharmaceutical manufacturers who pay to reach patients at intake, not from the practices. Phreesia cut its fiscal 2027 outlook to $510–520M because of reduced visibility into that spending [B]. Weave (NYSE: WEAV) earned $239.0M in 2025, up 17%, from 39,625 customer locations. Most are small dental, optometry and medical practices [A, Weave release]. Luma Health raised a $130M Series C led by FTV Capital in November 2021, $160M in total, and claimed 550+ health systems and clinic networks [B]. Artera (formerly WELL Health Inc., renamed October 2022) had raised just under $100M by then and is reported to have added a $65M Series D led by Lead Edge Capital in December 2025 [B/C]. Relatient has been majority-owned by Brighton Park Capital since November 2019 and raised more than $100M of growth equity before buying Radix Health in 2021 [B]. Kyruus Health (provider search plus scheduling; it bought HealthSparq and Epion Health) and Solutionreach (Summit Partners since 2012) complete the field [B/C]. PocketHealth (Toronto; $33M Series B led by Round13 Capital in March 2024) is a niche: patients' access to their own medical images [B]. Why a newcomer cannot get in. The patient's login belongs to whoever holds the chart. For a health system on Epic, MyChart is already paid for, and any standalone tool must integrate with the record and justify itself on top of what is bundled. For a small practice, the record vendor bundles reminders and a portal, and Weave and Solutionreach already sell texting and payments. The standalone vendors with scale have found a second payer (Phreesia's pharma network) or a payments attach (Weave). That tells you a practice will not pay much for engagement on its own. Canada. Ocean (WELL Health) leads physician-office engagement and eReferral, Medeo is bundled with Loblaw's Accuro record, and portals from the provincial systems and hospitals cover the rest. The paying customer is a publicly funded practice with limited budget for add-ons, which is analyst judgment, not sourced. Incumbent vulnerability decides it: the record vendor owns the patient's login and bundles the layer, and the independent field is crowded and funded.

Epic holds 43.7% of acute hospitals and 56.9% of beds, and was the only vendor chosen by large health systems in 2025. Its position is reinforced by clinician training investment rather than contract terms, and certification (ONC in the US, provincial conformance in Canada) is a multi-year floor before a single seat is sold. There IS visible instability — roughly 30% of Oracle Health customers say the platform is not in their long-term plans and another 35% are considered vulnerable — but that displaced demand flows to Epic and Meditech, not to a new entrant. Note also that EHR purchase decisions fell 40% in 2025: the buying window itself is narrowing.

What this category is. These are online booking marketplaces. A patient searches by specialty, location and insurance, reads reviews and books a slot. The practice pays a subscription that bundles its public profile, an online calendar, reminders that cut no-shows and light practice-management software. The coded customer is the physician's office (6211), but the same product is sold to dentists, physiotherapists, psychologists and other independent practitioners. How it differs from the neighbouring records. Electronic health records and practice management (6211, Epic and the ambulatory EHRs) sell the clinical record. A booking marketplace sells patient acquisition, and scheduling is the hook that gets it into the practice. The marketplace holds the patient demand, not the chart. Telehealth (6219) sells the visit itself. The dental (621210), chiropractic (621310) and behavioural-health (621330) records cover single-profession practice software. Jane appears there as a multi-discipline clinic system, and its online booking serves the clinic's own patients rather than a marketplace of competing practitioners. The leaders are regional, and each holds its own geography. Docplanner (Warsaw) runs ZnanyLekarz in Poland, Doctoralia in Spain and Latin America, MioDottore in Italy and jameda in Germany across 13 countries. It claims 300,000 active doctors and 100 million monthly patient visits [C, vendor]. It merged with Doctoralia in 2016 alongside a $20M Series C led by Target Global, raised a €15M Series D in 2017 (ENERN lead) and an €80M Series E in 2019 (One Peak and Goldman Sachs Private Capital), then took a 2021 round at more than $1B whose amount was not disclosed [B]. By its own account it had raised about €300M by November 2021, when it bought jameda from Hubert Burda Media [B]. Its Polish subsidiary filed PLN 212.5M of 2024 revenue and PLN 50.7M of net profit, and management talks of about $300M of group revenue in 2026 and a listing in two to three years [B, wirtualnemedia.pl]. Doctolib (Paris) holds France, Germany and Italy. It raised €150M at $1.13B in 2019 (General Atlantic) and €500M of equity and debt at €5.8B in 2022 (Eurazeo lead), about $815M in all [B]. It now claims 520,000 health professionals [C, vendor], and a reported 2026 secondary priced it near €3.6B [C, via secondary report]. Zocdoc (New York) holds the US: $130M at $1.8B in 2015 (Baillie Gifford and Atomico) and $150M of growth financing from Francisco Partners in 2021, when it said it was profitable after moving from flat subscriptions to a fee per booking [B]. Practo (Bengaluru) holds India and sells its Ray clinic software alongside the marketplace [A for the product; B for the $55M 2017 and $32M 2020 rounds]. Why a newcomer cannot get in. The practice pays for patients, so a marketplace with no patient traffic has nothing to sell. Building that traffic means years of consumer search and review content, and each incumbent's moat is one country's patients. Below the marketplaces the field is crowded with scheduling-and-reminder software that has no demand side of its own: Jane (North Vancouver, valued at about $1.8B), Cliniko (Melbourne, bootstrapped, $45 to $395 a month), Tebra (Kareo plus PatientPop), NexHealth ($125M Series C at $1B) and Solv (urgent care, over $80M raised) [B/C]. The Canadian gap is structural, not open. No national doctor-booking marketplace leads in Canada. Medically necessary physician services are publicly insured, so a GP cannot pay a marketplace to buy demand the way a private practice in Warsaw, Paris or New York can. The paying customers are allied-health and private clinics, and Jane already serves them. This is analyst judgment, not sourced. Distribution decides it: the asset is the patient audience, and every geography that pays for one already has a funded owner.

The buyer changed. There are ~2,000 dental service organisations where there were ~100 in 2010, and they acquire practices running incompatible systems — creating the same migration wedge as insurance brokerage, but in a market that is growing rather than shrinking.

How chiropractic differs from rehab therapy (621340). Rehab software is built around insurance: WebPT and its rivals compete on documentation that survives payer and Medicare review, and the visit is billed to a third party. A chiropractic office sells many more short visits, usually as a care plan: a course of adjustments scheduled ahead and often paid up front or as a monthly membership. Part of the profession runs cash-only. That changes what the software has to do. It needs recurring card billing for memberships and prepaid plans, a ledger for plan balances, fast spinal-adjustment SOAP templates, and personal-injury and auto-accident case files alongside ordinary insurance claims. Discounting is also a compliance problem: charging cash patients less than insurers invites dual-fee-schedule trouble. A whole product, ChiroHealthUSA, exists to sell practices a 'compliant membership model' as a discount medical plan; it claims 7,700+ providers [C, vendor]. These are analyst framings of the workflow; the vendor pages confirm the features (ChiroSpring sells 'Memberships', ChiroTouch's CT Pay sets up recurring payments, ClinicMind sells a 'Cash-Only / Private Pay' plan) [C, vendor]. The incumbent is ChiroTouch, and it now sits inside a private-equity roll-up. It claims 12,500+ chiropractic practices [C, vendor]. K1 bought it in 2014, Waud Capital Partners took a stake in 2017 [B, socaltech], and in September 2023 Waud's platform (Integrated Practice Solutions, whose chiropractic line is ChiroTouch) merged into PracticeTek under Lightyear Capital majority ownership, with Greater Sum Ventures and Waud keeping stakes [B, Lightyear release]. PracticeTek also owns ChiroSpring, the cloud challenger that sells memberships; ChiroSpring's founder is quoted on PracticeTek's site, and the two share a San Diego address [C]. So the incumbent and one of the best-reviewed challengers have the same owner. Second consolidator: ClinicMind, which absorbed Genesis Chiropractic Software (its homepage now offers 'ClinicMind EHR 1.0 formerly Genesis') and sells EHR plus outsourced billing [A for the merger; date January 2024 from search summary, not opened]. The best-funded challengers. ChiroHD (Atlanta, founded 2017) raised $26M of growth capital from Mainsail Partners in April 2025 [B]. Jane (North Vancouver) is multi-discipline rather than chiropractic-only. It raised under $10M of primary capital, including $2M of CIBC debt in 2019 [B], and was valued at about $1.8B in a May 2025 secondary of $500M-plus led by TCV with JMI Equity and Tidemark [B]; reported revenue was about US$100M [B, The Logic via techcouver]. Practice Better (Toronto; US$27M led by Five Elms, April 2023, and US$13M of CIBC growth debt, November 2024) [B] named chiropractors as a target vertical when it raised. A new entrant would face a PE-owned incumbent that already bundles payments and recurring billing, a venture-funded cloud challenger aimed squarely at it, and a Canadian multi-discipline platform worth more than any of them. Incumbent vulnerability decides it. No vendor publishes revenue except Jane's reported figure.

How this differs from general EHR and practice management (6211). The general record is about Epic and the hospital market, where certification and clinician training decide who wins. An optometry office is a clinic with a shop attached. The software has to run the eye exam (refraction, pre-test device data, retinal imaging) and also an optical store: frame and contact-lens inventory, a point-of-sale counter, and lens orders sent to labs. The money side runs on two tracks. Routine eye exams and eyewear are paid through vision plans (VSP, EyeMed and others), which have their own eligibility checks, authorizations and claims. Medical eye care is billed to ordinary health insurance. Generic EHRs do not do frames, lab orders or vision-plan claims, which is why the category exists. The incumbent is a payer. Eyefinity is part of VSP Vision, the largest vision plan, and sells the only optometry software with a direct connection to VSP for real-time eligibility, authorizations and claims [C, vendor]. That claims link is the moat. In October 2025 NextGen Healthcare licensed it too: its ophthalmology and optometry customers now get Eyefinity's VSP claims, frame inventory, point of sale and lab ordering [B, NextGen release]. The independents are old and private. RevolutionEHR (Madison, founded 2006, majority-owned by the RevOptix investor group since 2014 [B]) claims 13,000+ eye care professionals [C]. Crystal PM (Austin) claims 8,000+ independent optometry providers [C]. Compulink (since 1985) also sells to ophthalmology and other specialties. Sightview, formerly Eye Care Leaders, was sold to unnamed owners in July 2024 and carries My Vision Express alongside iMedicWare, Medflow and ManagementPlus [B]. Ocuco (Dublin; €60M minority investment from Accel-KKR in 2023 [B]; 6,750+ sites in 88 countries [C]) sells optical retail and lab software, and its Canadian arm grew out of the EMRlogic acquisition. The one funded newcomer is small. Barti raised a $12M Series A led by Five Elms Capital in August 2025, with AOAExcel (the American Optometric Association's for-profit arm) as an investor [B]. It sells an AI-first all-in-one system and has onboarded about 200 practices [C]. Patient messaging is a separate layer owned by Weave (NYSE: WEAV; $239.0M revenue in 2025, 39,625 customer locations across dental, optometry and other verticals [A]), and Eyefinity lists Weave as an integration partner. The buyer is consolidating. By the end of 2023, private-equity platforms ran hundreds of offices each: MyEyeDr 842, AEG Vision 400+, EyeCare Partners 385+, Keplr Vision 278 [B, Vision Monday]. Those groups standardise on one system and negotiate enterprise terms, which leaves a shrinking independent market split among 25-year-old vendors that each claim thousands of providers. A new entrant would need the vision-plan claims link the payer owns, the device and lab integrations the incumbents built over two decades, and a buyer that is not being acquired. Incumbent vulnerability decides it. No optometry software vendor publishes revenue.